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The Paradoxes of Moldovan Sports
An insight into the nature of the Transnistrian conflict
The military conflict in the early 1990s split Moldova into two; thus Trans-
nistria, which was set up on the eastern bank of the Dniester river as a se -
parate state, remains unrecognised by the international community to
date. This breakaway province has grown stronger, as today it possesses
almost all the internal attributes of statehood, including an effective
political system, an army and its own currency. The memory of the 1992
conflict, in which around one thousand people were killed, is the found-
ing myth of Transnistria, and hostility towards Moldova has been used
by the political elite in Tiraspol as a foundation of the state ideology and
a key propaganda tool.
The Transnistrian problem is usually seen as analogous to a few other se-
paratist conflicts which broke out twenty years ago as a consequence of
the fall of the Soviet empire and have not yet been resolved in a manner
which would satisfy all the parties involved and also gain support from
the major international actors. However, the Transnistrian conflict is clear -
ly different in its nature from the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia or
Nagorno-Karabakh. Relations between Moldova proper and this breakaway
province cannot be described by simple definitions or seemingly obvious
analogies.
Mutual relations in the area of sports, which in contemporary internatio -
nal contacts often not only reflect the true nature of political relations
but sometimes even affect them, can be a valuable contribution to the ana -
lysis of this conflict’s nature.
Why did the Transnistrian government, despite constant assertions of ab-
solute sovereignty and the use of anti-Moldovan rhetoric, at the same time
agree to Transnistrian athletes representing Moldova during the Olympics
and in other international competitions? Why does it accept the presence
of sports teams from both banks of the Dniester playing in the same lea -
5
gues? Why does Transnistria, despite being much smaller, predominate
in many sports, especially football, the most popular game in Mol do va?
How is it that Sheriff Tiraspol, the flagship football club of the bu siness
and political circles controlling Transnistria, managed to win the Mol dovan
championship ten times in a row and now represents Moldova in the Cham -
pions League? How is it that the same club is the main source of players
for Moldova’s national team? Does sport really ‘know no borders’ or per-
haps the border on the Dniester is different than seems at first sight?
The loneliness of the unrecognised
The independence of Transnistria has not been recognised by any coun-
try in the world, not even the Russian Federation, which (while using
this breakaway province as a means to put pressure on Moldova) has been
a de facto protector and banker of Transnistria for many years. This lack
of recognition by the international community has closed the doors for
Transnistria to membership in international sports federations under
the aegis of the Olympic Movement and consequently to participation in
sporting competitions held by them under Transnistria’s own flag. This
isolation extends to national teams, clubs and individual athletes alike.
In the case of football, the ban on contacts between federations which
are members of FIFA and those not belonging to this organisation
extends also to friendly matches. This means that international activity
is limited to meetings with amateur teams or those from quasi-states
with a similar status1. The international isolation of sporting competitors
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1 Following the example of such initiatives as the football federation, NF-Board, the
members of which include teams from both de facto independent but internationally iso-
lated states (Somaliland and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) and provinces
which are not even considering seriously becoming sovereign (like Scandinavian
Lappland or Italian Padania).
affects even such well-established entities as for example Kosovo, which
has been re c ognised by over eighty countries2.
International isolation of sportspersons is usually one of the many costs
quasi-states are willing to pay in their desire to strengthen their inde-
pendence and convince the world that it is justified and irrevocable.
Nagorno-Karabakh has cut off all links with the sports federations of
Azerbaijan, as have Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the federations of
Georgia, as a natural and indisputable consequence of the military con-
flicts of the early 1990s. As a result, no global sport federation recognis-
es any of those three Southern Caucasian quasi-states3.
The breakaway territories in the Southern Caucasus initially pinned their
hopes for breaking their isolation in sports on their patrons: Nagorno-
-Ka rabakh on Armenia; Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Russia. Given the
un compromising policy of international sport federations, these attempts
were doomed to failure, in terms of both sports and propaganda.
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2 The recognition of Kosovo by the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) set a pre -
cedent, which however has been followed by a few small unions so far. In practice, UN
membership is a necessary precondition for joining most international sport federations
(although sometimes dependencies such as Puerto Rico, the Bermudas or Hong Kong are
also admitted).
3 The government of Abkhazia takes pride in its membership of the International Domino
Federation and its right to host the world domino championships in 2011. Although this
game is very popular in Abkhazia, it needs to be emphasised that not only is dominoes
not an Olympic sport, but it is also unrecognised as a non-Olympic sport by the Inter na -
tio nal Olympic Committee. Abkhazia’s membership in the domino federation, which is
dominated by Latin American countries, has been possible owing to lobbying from
Venezuela (which is one of the five states to have recognised Abkhazia’s independence).
See: In Hosting Domino Championship, Abkhazia Hopes To Score Internationally,
19 October 2011, http://origin.rferl.org/content/dominoes_world_championships_
abkhazia/24364717.html; M. Schwirtz, For Abkhazia, Recognition In Coming Piece by
Piece, „The New York Times”, 8 September 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/
world/europe/09abkhazia.html?pagewanted=all
Football players (and other athletes) from Nagorno-Karabakh have not
been able to put down roots in Armenia to anything like the same degree
as politicians originating from the same province, who have dominated
politics in Yerevan for more than ten years owing to clan ties. Although
football club Karabakh was established in the mid 1990s (renamed later
as Lernayin Artsakh) and was to represent Nagorno-Karabakh football in
the Armenian league, the team had to be registered in Yerevan and play
its home matches there because otherwise Armenia may have been ex -
cluded from FIFA/UEFA. This led to a deepening of Nagorno-Karabakh’s
iso lation in football. To prevent this, the local government in 2009 decid-
ed to establish a separate Nagorno-Karabakhi league, unaffiliated with
any international organisations, and Lernayin Artsakh was moved to
Stepanakert to play with amateur teams from Nagorno-Karabakh.
The government of South Ossetia had to resolve similar dilemmas. Imme-
diately after becoming independent from Georgia, its strongest football
club, Spartak Tskhinvali, started playing in the amateur league of North
Ossetia, its sister republic, which is part of the Russian Federation.
However, the team is formally registered in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia,
and cannot play matches on the southern slopes of the Caucasus that
forms the border between the two republics. The Russian football feder-
ation, aware of FIFA’s and UEFA’s stance, has over recent years rejected
numerous requests from South Ossetia and Abkhazia for allowing their
teams or athletes to take part in any official sport competitions, includ-
ing football matches (they are only allowed to participate in unofficial
competitions and amateur tournaments). Although Moscow recognised
the independence of the two separatist republics in August 2008, its
stance on this issue remains unchanged.
Those countries which need to face the problem of separatism are also
aware of the role sport plays in propaganda. A football club named Spar tak
Tskhinvali participates not only in the Russian league on North Ossetia but
also in Georgia’s premier league, except that the latter team is registered
in Tbilisi (it was registered in Gori before the war of 2008). Its name serves
to remind of the bonds between Georgia and its lost province. Similar in -
8
tentions also lie behind the participation of FC Gagra (and previously Dina-
mo Sukhumi also), a club in Tbilisi which formally represents refugees
from Abkhazia. A similar role is also played by FK Qarabağ Ağdam, one of
Azerbaijan’s strongest teams. Contrary to what its name suggests, the
club presently has little in common with Ağdam, a totally destroyed and
deserted town on the frontier with Nagorno-Karabakh, which is con-
trolled by Armenians. It operated for more than ten years in Baku, the
capital of Azerbaijan, and now it plays home matches in Quzanlı, a place
adjacent to the territories occupied by Armenians.
Independence a` la carte
Unlike the case of the Southern Caucasian quasi-states (and the absolute
ma jority of separatist entities around the world), the government of Trans -
nistria has not chosen to break sporting ties with Moldova. Competitors
and teams from the eastern bank of the Dniester are admitted to almost
all Moldovan sport federations, taking part in internal Moldovan com-
petitions according to established rules (fulfilment of qualification stan-
dards) and represent Moldova during international competitions, including
the Olympics. Five of the thirty-one athletes who represented Moldova
in the most recent Olympic Games (Beijing 2008) originated from Trans -
nistria.
Transnistrian athletes must hold Moldovan passports as one of the for-
mal conditions they are required to fulfil to be able to take part in inter-
national competitions. This is not unduly controversial however, since
Moldovan passports are held by approximately 230,000 of the approxima-
tely 550,000 residents of Transnistria. Because it is impossible to travel
abroad with passports issued by Transnistria, its residents also hold pass -
ports issued by Russia (approximately 120,000 people, including most of
the establishment) and Ukraine (approximately 100,000 people).
Sporting competitors, mainly football players, also capitalise on the issue
of citizenship in a different context. Many of them, from Transnistria and
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Moldova proper alike, accept Russian passports in order to facilitate play-
ing in the rich Russian league (owing to this they do not have to com-
pete for places in Russian teams under limitations set for foreigners). 
It was revealed in 2008 that over half of the key players in Moldova’s
national team, held Russian citizenship. Later, some of them decided
against playing for Moldova’s national team because they were afraid of
being removed from the Russian league4.
The true reason behind the Transnistrian government’s decision to keep
sporting ties with Moldova is certainly not its attachment to the Olympic
ideal. This is more an effect of the nature of the Transnistrian conflict
and of the current interests of the local political and business elites.
What makes the Transnistrian conflict distinct from most other con-
temporary separatist movements (including all the aforementioned con-
flicts in the post-Soviet area) is its roots. What triggered the civil war
there was not antagonism between different ethnic groups but enmity
within the political elite. The independence of Moldova, and conse-
quently the severance of many of its ties to Moscow, was perceived by
the Sovietised nomenklatura in the largely industrial province that
Transnistria was as a threat to its status (this little province accounted
for 40% of Moldova’s industrial production). The separatists skilfully
played the ethnic card by fomenting fears of the allegedly imminent
Romanisation of Moldova among the Russian-speaking population, who
predominate in the eastern bank of the Dniester. The disputes over lin-
guistic (the status of the Rus sian language) and cultural issues, even if ini-
tially they were used as a trigger to enable escalation of the conflict,
were clearly less important than the political and business calculations.
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4 Жосан и Гацкан не будут играть за сборную Молдовы!, 2 September 2008, http://www.
moldfootball.com/?index=news&news=3133; Павел Чобану: Не следует да вать граж -
данство всем игрокам национальной сборной подряд, 18 March 2010, http://press.
try.md/item.php?id=111539
Actions taken by the Russian 14th Army, stationed on the eastern bank of
the Dniester, which tipped the scales of victory in the conflict in favour
of the separatists and later forced the ceasefire, were also important5.
Shortly before the outbreak of the military conflict, Moldovans – albeit
a mi nority compared to the Slavic population – constituted the most
numerous ethnic group in Transnistria, accounting for 40% of its popu-
lation (other groups included Ukrainians – 28%, Russians – 25%, and Bul-
garians – 4%). Although the Transnistrian government has taken actions
aimed against the Romanian language (officially called Moldovan on both
banks of the Dniester, but spelt in Cyrillic in Transnistria) by eliminating
it from the education system except for elementary schools, this has not
affected the level of support among Transnistrian Moldovans for the lo cal
ruling class, who present themselves as the guarantors of relative stabi -
lity in both socio-economic and security terms. The sociological surveys
available indicate that one in four residents of Transnistria is ready to
support a form of reintegration with Moldova (21% for federation and
7% for autonomy)6. Interestingly, there is no ethnic correlation in this
case (reintegration is more frequently supported by younger and better-
educated people, who live in Russified cities and not in the ethnically
Moldovan countryside). Similarly, more Russians lived at the time of the
conflict (and live now) in Chisinau alone than in Transnistria as a whole,
which by no means predetermined their support for Transnistrian sepa-
ratism.
It is the lack of ethnic enmity which explains why the bonds between
people on both sides of the Dniester have been reestablished so easily,
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5 For more see: И. Косташ, Дни затмения: хроника необъявленной войны, Кишинев
2010; A. Eberhardt, Nierozwiązane konflikty na obszarze posowieckim – polityka Fe de -
ra cji Rosyjskiej, [in:] A.D. Rotfeld (ed.), Dokąd zmierza świat?, Warszawa 2008.
6 Е. Бобкова, Социальное и экономическое самочувствие населения двух берегов
Днестра в условиях замороженного конфликта // Молдова – Приднестровье. Общими
усилиями – к успешному будущему. Социальные аспекты, Кишинэу 2009, page 16.
concerning the movement of both people and goods. In the case of sport-
ing relations, it is difficult even to say that they were ever broken off:
mi litary clashes in the spring of 1992 did not interrupt the league match-
es, which were being played at the same time. Although the conflict did
prevent the final game of the season between Zimbru Chisinau and
Tiligul Tiraspol, which would have been the championship decider,
matches with the participation of Transnistrian teams were resumed by
the autumn of the same year.
Thus the Transnistrian government’s aggressive anti-Moldovan rhetoric
is accompanied by a selective approach towards taking definite actions,
due to calculations both economic and image-related. The separatists are
interested in a compromise with Chisinau first of all in trade (all Trans -
nistrian firms wanting to export their production must be registered in
Moldova) and also in sports. Being part of Moldovan sport enables Trans -
nistria to avoid isolation and also derive benefits in the area of propa-
ganda; the successes of competitors who originate from Transnistria (al -
though they formally represent Moldova and are financed from the Mol -
do van state budget) are presented by the Transnistrian government as
proofs of the separatist republic’s vitality and international recognition.
The government in Tiraspol, like most autocratic regimes, spares no ex -
pense on sports, seeing it as a convenient platform for rivalry with Mol -
dova, which is underinvested in this area. The government in Chisinau
seems to accept this and does not engage itself in rivalry with the sepa-
ratists, instead seeing sports as an important tool for counteracting the
deepening of the country’s division. Obviously, Moldova also derives sport-
ing benefits, strictly speaking, since the best athletes from its breakaway
region contribute to the country’s strength in international competitions.
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Transnistria’s predominance in sports
Although the population of this separatist republic is six times smaller
than that of Moldova proper, and Transnistrian athletes compete under
the flag of Moldova and are members of Moldovan federations, Trans -
nistria is by no means merely an exotic addition to Moldovan sports. On
the contrary, Transnistrian sport clubs, which are backed financially by
the separatist government and to an even greater extent by local big
business, have gained very strong and often dominating influence. Since
corruption is widespread in Moldovan sports, Transnistrian sports offi-
cials, using informal social and business connections, can usually count
on favours from certain Moldovan sport federations.
A major contributor to this is the fact that almost all sports are strongly
Russified and Sovietised in Moldova, marked by the predominance of
sports officials who came to what was then Soviet Moldavia from other
Soviet republics. In effect, not only have the ties between sports federa-
tions and rich Transnistrian clubs not weakened but they have even
become stronger. Clubs from Moldova proper have protested on numer-
ous occasions against such informal corruption-based connections
resulting in discrimination in favour of Transnistrian sports. Allegations
of unequal treatment have concerned such sports as boxing, athletics
and football. It seems that corruption in Moldovan sports is just a small
part of the much more serious phenomenon, namely links between local
sports officials and organised crime, which separatist Transnistria, by its
nature, remains a den of7.
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7 In the middle of 2011, Moldova was shocked by two incidents which revealed links be tween
sports and crime in this country. The head of Moldova’s tennis federation and its only offi-
cial sponsor was assassinated in June 2011 in Chisinau as a result of mafia wars. In turn,
in September 2011, a former world champion in kickboxing shot dead a son-in-law of the
former head of the organised crime section, who in turn was involved in the murder of
a bu sinessman who was known to have had links with criminal circles. See: Убийство Иона
Стратулата – в центре внимания молдавской прессы, 20 September 2011, http://ru.
publika.md/link_284751.html, Взрыв, в котором погиб Игорь Цуркан, органи зовал мол-
давский преступный авторитет «Господин»?, 7 July 2011, http://kp.md/online/news/929178
Transnistria’s predominance in sports is most vivid in the case of foot-
ball, the most popular and also the most financially lucrative sport in
Moldova. Sheriff Tiraspol unquestionably dominated in Moldovan foot-
ball for ten seasons in a row8, while in some seasons, as many as half of
the clubs in Moldova’s top league originated from the small province of
Transnistria.
Characteristically, some clubs from Moldova proper have been bought
by Transnistrian business representatives and then transferred to Trans -
nistria. The most widely publicised example of this was the top-league
football club Constructorul Chisinau, which after being moved to the
capital city of Transnistria, in 2002 started playing in Moldova’s top
league as FC Tiraspol. As a result of financial links with the province’s larg-
est company, this team, though officially a competitor to Sheriff Tiraspol,
became a source of stand-in players and easily obtained points in league
games for the latter club.
Transnistrian clubs also predominate in other, less popular team sports.
PGU Tiraspol has been the undisputed leader in Moldova’s handball (ele -
ven champion titles over the past thirteen years), and Dinamo Tiraspol
is the most prize-winning volleyball club in Moldova. The powers are
more evenly balanced in the case of rugby, which is popular on both
banks of the Dniester. Interestingly, some Transnistrian rugby clubs par-
ticipate in Moldovan and some in Ukrainian league games. This is possi-
ble owing to the open formula of Ukraine’s rugby union championships.
14
8 FC Sheriff lost the championship of Moldova to Dacia Chisinau in the 2010/11 season.
So far, Skonto Riga has been the only European club to have won more than ten champion-
ships in a row (champion of Latvia for fourteen seasons in 1991-2004). The Transnistrian
team has thus beaten such ‘nine-time champions’ as Ukraine’s Dynamo Kyiv (champion
in 1993-2001) and Scotland’s Celtic Glasgow (1966-1974) and Glasgow Rangers (1989-
1997). This Transnistrian club has produced several surprises in the qualifying games of
the Champions League by eliminating teams such as Slavia Prague and Dinamo Zagreb.
It has managed to qualify two times in a row to the UEFA Europa League, winning
against Dynamo Kyiv, for instance.
The Sheriff empire
The dominant position of Transnistria’s Sheriff in Moldovan football is
just a tiny section of this firm’s activity, essential for understanding the
nature of the political and business connections functioning in Trans nis -
tria. If Transnistria, given the scope and nature of its connections with
Moldova proper, could be described as a ‘state within a state’, then the
Sheriff company can be identified – without exaggeration – as another ele -
ment of this Russian-style matryoshka doll, a ‘state within a quasi-state’,
which Transnistria is.
Sheriff was established in 1993 by two relatively unknown former officers
of the Transnistrian Interior Ministry (Viktor Gushan and Ilya Kazmaly).
However, the company’s true unofficial owners have been the main or
even the sole beneficiaries of its success. Sheriff is in fact a business base
for a significant part of the Transnistrian political elite. Close ties with
the holding of Vladimir Smirnov, the elder son of the president of this
se paratist republic and at the same time the head of the Transnistrian
customs service, have been an open secret for many years. The presi-
dent’s younger son, Oleg Smirnov, according to media reports, has also
held ma nagerial positions in Sheriff-controlled companies.
Over time, some cracks in the connections between the strengthening
hold ing company and the Transnistrian president emerged. Sheriff
creat ed its own political representation, Renewal (Obnovleniye), which
is be coming the strongest political party in Transnistria and is taking an
un clear albeit generally competitive stance against Igor Smirnov. United
Russia, the governing party in the Russian Federation, is an official part-
ner of Renewal, which has been intensively used in the latter’s campaign
as a means of earning support among the Russophile population of Trans-
nistria (Russia has also featured in the campaign of Renewal candidate,
Parliament Speaker Anatoly Kaminsky, in the presidential elections sche -
duled for December 2011).
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At present, Sheriff forms the backbone of Transnistria; this firm owns
achain of filling stations, supermarkets which predominate in the retail
market and largest wholesale businesses. It also owns the only private
TV station and is a monopoly providing cable TV services to most residents
of Transnistria. Additionally, it owns the only mobile communication
network, the largest publishing house, an advertising agency, a con struc-
tion firm, food production plants and a distillery which manufactures Kvint
brandies.
Capitalising on the favourable disposition towards it from a significant
part of the Transnistrian elite for many years, this firm has monopolised
the most profitable trade contracts (the import of petroleum products,
spirits and cigarettes), and has been granted special customs and fiscal
preferences. Very few experts in this region challenge the widely shared
belief that Sheriff also earns fabulous amounts of money on wholly crim-
inal activities, such as smuggling across the 400-km-long poorly pro-
tected border between Transnistria and Ukraine, which is not guarded
by Moldovan border and customs services. The most frequently used
trick is to bring goods from third countries to the Odessa port in Ukraine
to import them to Transnistria (owing to which they are exempt from
Ukrainian customs duty and sanitary requirements) and then smuggle
them back to Ukraine. This explains the conclusion that could be
reached on the basis of customs data that poultry consumption in
Transnistria is dozens of times higher than elsewhere in the world.
The holding company added sports to its business activity in 1997 by
esta blishing the FC Sheriff Tiraspol sport club. Soon thereafter, the most
cutting-edge sporting facility within a radius of hundreds of kilometres,
comprising a stadium with 15,500 seats for the audience, eight training
pitches, a residential complex for football players, a five-star hotel and
a modern football school for children and young people, was built for
around US$200 million in the western outskirts of Tiraspol. Sheriff’s sta-
dium was for many years the only stadium in Moldova where Moldovan
national team’s matches were allowed to be played by UEFA due to the
terrible condition the republican stadium in Chisinau was in.
16
The fact that the Moldovan national team, up to half of which consisted
of Transnistrian players, played at the stadium in Transnistria has obvious -
ly been used for propaganda purposes by the government of the break-
away province, which was boasting about not only the strength of local
football but also of the modern infrastructure. At the same time, Trans -
nistrian regime had to accept what is saw as unfavourable conditions
set by UEFA, such as displaying the flag and playing the national anthem
of Moldova. Although tickets to the matches usually contained elements
of Trans nistrian symbols, their price had to be stated in Moldovan lei
(and not Transnistrian roubles), and the text on them had to be typed in
Ro manian (Moldovan) using the Latin (and not Cyrillic) alphabet.
The separatist government attempted to demonstrate its independence
by refusing representatives of the Moldovan government who wished to
see football games from entering Transnistria. The biggest scandal took
place in 2003, when the Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin, having
os tensibly stressed that Moldova had authority over Transnistria, was re -
fused entry to Transnistria on the following day. The first senior state
official from Moldova to have been admitted to Sheriff’s stadium was
Prime Minister Vlad Filat, who was cheering on Transnistria’s Sheriff
Tiraspol during the match with Switzerland’s FC Basel in 2010. The match
provided the opportunity for the Moldovan prime minister to meet with
Transnistria’s president, Igor Smirnov. A deal on reintroducing the Chisi -
nau-Tiraspol-Odessa railway connection for passengers was struck dur-
ing this meeting. Within the next few months, Moldova’s pro-European
government coalition of liberal parties, as part of its policy of encourag-
ing Transnistria to start a dialogue, adopted regulations which facilitat-
ed entry to the Ukrainian market for representatives of Trans nistrian
business circles.
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Is Moldova being ‘Transnistrianised’?
The strong position Transnistria (especially Sheriff) has managed to build
in Moldovan sports and the social ills this entails may be used as an illus-
tration of the threats the preservation of the status quo could bring
about, and also of those which could intensify in the case of a possible
reintegration of Moldova.
Moldova and the European Union, being its neighbour, are obviously
interested in resolving this conflict, which has been deadlocked for twen-
ty years and which has impeded the country’s internal transformation.
However, a solution which would guarantee broad autonomy to Trans -
nistria within a united Moldova and thus enable the preservation of the
existing political and business model on the eastern bank of the Dniester
while at the same time involving Transnistria in the decision-making
pro cess across the country as a whole would be a cure worse than the
disease. This could lead to a ‘Transnistrianisation’ of the weak Moldovan
statehood, analogous to the ‘Transnistrianisation’ of sports which is cur-
rently taking place in Moldova.
This threat is not merely hypothetical. Russia, the most important player
in this region, wants the conflict to be settled in a way which would make
it possible to convert Russian influences on the eastern bank of the
Dniester into a lasting strategic control over Moldova as a whole (a sig-
nificant element of which would serve to thwart any deepening of this
country’s integration with the European Union). The Russian concept
presented in November 2003 (the so-called Kozak Memorandum), which
was rejected by Moldova as a result of clear hints from the EU, as well
as similar initiatives presented later, contained a proposal to guarantee
a pri vileged position to Transnistria within a federalised Moldova. Cur -
ren tly, Russia is also lobbying for a similar solution as part of consulta-
tions on Transnistria with Germany, initiated by President Dmitri Med -
vedev and Chancellor Angela Merkel in Meseberg in June 2010. Moscow
wants its co-operation with Germany on Transnistria to lead to the esta -
blishment of a common EU-Russian decision-making mechanism concer n-
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ing security issues. At the same time, this co-operation will be used to
increase pressure on Chisinau and thus convince the Moldovan govern-
ment to accept the Russian proposals for resolving the conflict. If Mol -
dova rejects these proposals, as is highly likely, it will be held responsible
for sabotaging the peace process and thus for continuation of the con flict.
In addition to the obvious adverse impact on Moldova’s international
image, this situation couldalso generate internal political costs. In the opi -
nion of most residents of Moldova proper (78%) and Transnistria (56%),
the unregulated status of this breakaway territory is not beneficial to
either party in this conflict (obviously, each of the parties understands
‘conflict resolution’ in a different way). According to some respondents,
the continuation of the present situation is beneficial only to Trans nis tria
(this is the opinion of 21% of the residents on the eastern and 8% on the
western bank of the Dniester). Very few people on both sides of the river
believe that the continuation of the present situation is in the interests
of Moldova proper9.
‘Go Russia!’
The schizophrenic nature of Moldovan-Transnistrian relations – the hos-
tility towards Moldova fomented over two decades by the government
in Tiraspol on the one hand, and the broad scope of social and econom-
ic ties between the two banks of the Dniester on the other (together
with the widespread awareness that the status quo helps neither side) –
is giving rise to ambivalent stances among residents of the two banks of
the Dniester regarding their perceptions of one another. Contacts in the
area of sports, especially the most popular, football, serve as a good
illustration of this.
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Е. Бобкова, Модели развития Молдовы и Приднестровья в постконфликтный период,
http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Proiecte/blacksee/rus/_Bobcova_-_rus.pdf
Since Transnistrian clubs predominate in the Moldovan league and Trans -
nistrian football players are present in Moldova’s national team, resi-
dents of this breakaway territory accept the existence of the common
sporting space. They are proud of the successes of Transnistrian athletes
and at the same time tend to look down on the west-bank Moldovans,
seeing them as poor relations, a more backward region, unable to
achieve any success, whether in the sporting or socio-political field. This
critical stance does not necessarily mean, and usually does not indicate,
hostility towards Moldova. It is significant that most residents of
Transnistria lived in what was formerly Soviet Moldavia – some of them
have friends and families on the opposite bank, some study or work
there, and some hold Moldovan passports. Although most of the tickets
to matches played by the Moldovan national football team in Tiraspol
were distributed among residents of Transnistria – mainly young peo-
ple, who have grown up in this breakaway province – this did not pro-
voke any hostile reactions to wards Moldova, even during such symbolic
moments as the playing of the Moldovan national anthem (although peo-
ple who are more interested in politics than sports less readily accept
Moldovan state symbols). Since no comprehensive sociological surveys
are available, it is worth citing in di vidual examples. A remark made by a
resident of Tiraspol on the main Moldovan online football portal seems
quite characteristic: “I’m always happy when the Moldovan national
team wins (this is the country where I was born and which I am a citi-
zen of), but I wouldn’t be able to cheer them on, sing the national
anthem and chant ‘Mol-do-va’ with full devotion, even though I am an
active football fan… This is what the Russian national team is for.”10
In fact, despite this lack of hostility, residents of Transnistria are rather
moderately attached to Moldova. Their warm feelings, in both sporting
and other areas of life, are usually reserved for Russia. Sometimes, during
Moldovan league games, fans of Transnistrian clubs would chant ‘Russia,
Russia’, ‘Go Russia’ or ‘Russia-empire’, which is their way of teasing fans
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of the teams from Moldova proper. When the Under-21 national teams
of Moldova and Russia were playing a match in November 2009 at the sta-
dium in Tiraspol, the Moldovan team could not count on receiving sup port
from the spectators, since most of them were either behaving passively
or supporting the Russians. One of the explanations for the low interest
in this match was that a game played by the national teams of Russia and
Slovenia, which attracted incomparably more interest and raised much
stronger emotions in Transnistria, was broadcast on TV on the same day.
This attachment which the residents of Transnistria have to Russia is
not surprising; both the ethnic factor and the official ideology in this
breakaway territory contribute to this (‘Together with Russia’ is the title
of the book written by Transnistria’s president, Smirnov, and also the
name of the bloc created by his political competitor, the Renewal party,
as well as a slo gan frequently used during mass events held here).
Moscow is also successfully upholding its position in the region. The meth-
ods for strength ening Russia’s soft power in Transnistria include offering
humanitarian and technical aid reaching tens of US millions dollars
annually. Each pensioner in Transnistria receives a monthly benefit of
US$15 from Russia; and envelope with money is delivered directly to
each of them, skipping the official budget. Moscow also offers support to
small business and far mers in Transnistria. In turn, the younger genera-
tion is influenced by being handed Russian school textbooks, which not
only help Trans nistrian children learn to read and write but are also
forging their identity within the Russian cultural and political space
(“Vladimir Putin, my president/prime minister”).
However, the greatest support which Transnistria receives from Russia
is natural gas supplies, which have been received free of charge by the
sepa ratist government for years. Gazprom has charged this debt for gas,
which has already exceeded US$2.6 billion, to Moldova, arguing that
recognises the country’s territorial integrity11. Thus, by supporting the
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separatists, Moscow has gained a tool for influencing Chisinau and also
potentially Tiraspol (should the Transnistrian government choose to con-
duct a policy contrary to the Kremlin’s strategy).
A positive perception of Russia predominates among residents on both
banks of the Dniester. According to polls, more than half of residents of
Moldova proper believe that Russia should be the main strategic partner
for Chisinau, while the European Union was indicated by one in three
respondents12. A typical opinion is illustrated by the remarks the written
by a football fan from Chisinau on an online discussion forum showing
the grading of positive feelings for Russian, Transnistrian and strictly
Moldovan sports: “I like Russia’s Spartak [Moscow], which my father has
also supported for years, but when Spartak was playing with Sheriff
[Tiraspol], I was cheering Sheriff on at the top of my voice at the stadium!
This is a Moldovan team, and nothing can be more important! Though
I would Like Dacia [Chisinau] to be the champion of Moldova.”13
Additionally, pan-Romanian tendencies can be observed among some Mol -
dovans, especially young and better-educated people. To cite one more
remark, which illustrates the complexity of the choices Moldovans have
to make: “I am a fan of Zimbru [Chisinau]. I hate Sheriff [Tiraspol] as an
opponent but I also respect this club for its good structure and playing
policy. I don’t understand those who are so eager to support [Romania’s]
Steaula [Bucharest] (I support it myself when it is playing with someone
else, but I think that supporting an opponent of a Moldovan teams is a syn-
drome of dementia) – if you do this, you are not cheering the team on,
you become totally Romanian. I’m completely sure that if Moldova’s na -
tional team was playing a match with Romanians, you would support
them. The likes of you are also in Tiraspol, except that they support Rus -
sia.”14 These opinions are illustration of a country in transition, which
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md/libview.php?l=en&idc=156&id=552
13 http://www.moldfootball.com/index.php?index=news&news=5339
14 http://www.moldfootball.com/index.php?index=news&news=5339
Moldova is today. This country has a weak identity, is lost between the
East and the West, between Moscow and Bucharest, and, moreover, is
split along the Dniester.
Although sporting contacts are just a tiny fragment of social relations,
they can be used as an example reflecting the complexity of the Trans -
nistrian conflict. The fact that the separatists, who otherwise foment
hostility towards the government in Chisinau, have agreed to keep a
com mon all-Moldovan sporting space (and also links in other selected
areas) is not a manifestation of their attachment to Olympic spirit, but
above all an effect of their political calculations and business interests.
This is possible owing to the special backgrounds of the conflict itself,
which is different from the vast majority of contemporary territorial dis-
putes originating from ethnic tensions.
The way the common sporting space is functioning in practice is at the
same time a case study which reveals the tendency for the Transnistrian
model to expand to Moldova proper. This process is augmented by the
present, hybrid status of Transnistria, which allows the separatists to
be nefit from their selective co-operation with Chisinau. However, this
threat would become much more serious if Moldova was reintegrated
on the basis of the federalisation principle proposed by Russia, which
would lead to the entrenchment of the present system in Transnistria and
the par ticipation of the Transnistrian nomenklatura in the government of
Mol dova. In which case, residents of Chisinau would begin to associate
the Tiraspol-based Sheriff not only with a very good football team but
also with a powerful business and political alliance capable of ruthlessly
capi talising on the weaknesses of Moldovan statehood.
Adam Eberhardt
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